

MEDIA HANDOUT

**Excerpts of a Sampling of Publicly Available Documents Regarding Connections
Between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks**

FBI Consolidated Summary, July 23, 2021

[EO14040-003479-UPDATED to -3608-UPDATED]¹

“The purpose of this 131-page communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001.” [-3479]

“An additional purpose ... is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government.” [-3480]

“[T]he SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US—many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network....” [-3480]

“Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.... Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members.” [-3485]

“Musaid Aljarrah (Musaed Aljarrah) was one of the known GIP officers in the [Ministry of Islamic Affairs] section.” [-3488]

“This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S.” [-3490]

“Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah ... was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts

with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan.” [-3496]

“... Aljarrah had a ‘controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California.’ Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of Almuhanna ... and Althumairy ... who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA.” [-3496 to -3497]

“Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar ‘Wahhabi line of thinking’ as Mohammed Almohanna.” [-3497]

“ALTHUMAIRY was identified [redacted] as a ‘hard core extremist’ whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.” [-3502]

“[Redacted] stated that he was told by that Fahad Al-Thumairy ... had asked him to look after two very ‘significant’ people. [Redacted] did not inquire into the word ‘significant’ or why he referred to them this way, other [than] to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important.” [-3503]

“[Redacted] recalls a conversation that he had ... shortly after ... Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A.... He states that [redacted] told [redacted] that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. [Redacted] asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. [Redacted] stated ... that he just needed to take them there. [Redacted] ... advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings.” [-3503]

“Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC.... [A]l-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A ‘welcoming party’ for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.” [-3509]

“Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel ... for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box

¹These documents, released publicly pursuant to Executive Order 14040, are available at <https://vault.fbi.gov/9-11-attacks-investigation-and-related-materials/9-11-material-released-in-response-to-executive-order-14040>.

in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice.” [-3509]

AL SADHAN works under . . . MUSAED AL-JARRAH [redacted] at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help ALJARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States.” [-3511]

“Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar. [redacted] Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a ‘ghost employee’ while in the U.S.” [-3515]

“The interviewee [an employee of Dallah Al Baraka] estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). . . . [Redacted] assured the interviewee that he wanted . . . Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by [redacted]. These purchase orders were controlled by . . . [the Presidency of Civil Aviation].” [-3517]

“From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.” [-3519]

“The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism.” [-3580]

“Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel [redacted] continued post 9/11.” [-3587]

FBI Report Re: Albayoumi/GIF Cooptee Reporting to Prince Bandar, June 14, 2017 [EO14040-002638 to -2639]

“In the late 1990’s and up to September 11 2001, Omar Albayoumi was paid a monthly stipend as a cooptee of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) via then Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan al Saud. The information Albayoumi obtained on persons of interest in the Saudi community in Los Angeles and San Diego and other issues, which met GIP Intelligence requirements would be forwarded to Bandar, Bandar would then inform the GIP of items of interest to the GIP for further investigation/vetting or follow up.” [-2638 to -2639]

“Allegations of al Bayoumi’s involvement with Saudi Intelligence were not confirmed at the time of the 9/11 Commission Report. The above information confirms these allegations.” [-2639]

FBI REPORT RE: CALL FROM MALAYSIA TO AL THUMAIRY DURING AL QAEDA SUMMIT [EO 14040-000518 to -523]

An FBI report “to report information garnered during a debriefing” of a confidential human source (“CHS”) includes the following statement:

“Around . . . the end of 1999, the [King Fahad Mosque] received a phone call from an individual in Malaysia. According to [redacted] the caller wanted to speak with AL THUMAIRY. [redacted] this phone call was regarding the imminent arrival of ‘two brothers...who needed their assistance.’ The ‘two brothers’ were according to [the CHS], NAWAF AL HAZMI and KHALID AL MIHDHAR.” [-520]

The document indicates that Fahad Al Thumairy received a call from Malaysia at a time when al Qaeda operatives (including Hazmi and Mihdhar) were there, advising him to watch for their arrival, indicating that Thumairy was told in advanced of the two AQ operative hijackers’ arrival.

CBS NEWS REPORT & AVIATION EXPERT’S CONCLUSION ABOUT BAYOUMI FLIGHT EQUATION

In an August 28, 2021 CBS News Report, Catherine Herridge reports on a notebook tied to Omar al Bayoumi said to contain a plane drawing and flight calculations and quotes a declaration of an aviation expert and former military and commercial pilot, who concluded:

“[t]he drawing an equation were to calculate the altitude of an aircraft necessary to view a target at a certain distance on the horizon. . . . [T]he drawing and equation were used to calculate the height of an aircraft necessary to see a target from two distances, specifically 50 and 70 miles from the target. . . . [T]he information . . . could be used to provide a rough but sufficient means to calculate the rate of descent for an aircraft to fly towards the target.” “I shared with the FBI my opinion that there was a reasonable basis to believe that the drawing and equation were used as part of the preparations of the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the 9/11 attacks.”

- o <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-declaration-on-notebook-from-home-of-associate-of-911-hijackers-to-be-filed-in-case-against-saudi-arabia/>
- o <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1G0Kd5yudSnkvVvIP4EiLm-2k2KFbizQA/view>