

SAMPLING OF
NEW EVIDENCE OF
SAUDI COMPLICITY
IN ATTACKS ON
SEPT. 11, 2001

SUPPORT FOR ENSURING JUSTICE
FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM ACT,
S. 2082 AND H.R. 4951



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The federal court overseeing the civil case against Saudi Arabia already ruled, in 2018, that Plaintiffs established that Saudi Arabia's officials and agents committed tortious acts that "caused" Plaintiffs' injuries in the September 11, 2001 attacks. *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 298 F. Supp. 3d 631, 650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Although those questions should not be open to further challenge, there now is compelling and damning new evidence corroborating the facts and theories plaintiffs have long asserted in the litigation.

Because the wall of evidence continues to grow, too high and too thick to address exhaustively here, we will summarize several telling new items of evidence uncovered from evidence seized by London's Metropolitan Police Service ("MPS") from the home of Omar al Bayoumi, one of the Saudi agents who has been shown to have aided the earliest arriving hijackers on their arrival in the United States.

That new evidence includes: Bayoumi's own hand-written line of sight calculation for navigating a plane to a target on the ground; a chilling video Bayoumi recorded in June 1999, that multiple U.S. intelligence officials have described as a "casing" video of the U.S. Capitol conducted when Al Qaeda was selecting targets for the 9/11 attack; a video of Bayoumi together in Washington, D.C., with two Saudi Embassy diplomats from its Ministry of Islamic Affairs, who either denied knowing Bayoumi or being with him in D.C.; highly incriminating video of the welcome party Bayoumi hosted for the hijackers on their arrival in the U.S. (never exploited by the FBI); and other video showing Bayoumi's close relationship with extremist cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki, who the CIA killed in a 2011 drone strike as a senior leader of an al Qaeda affiliate. In addition, we include samplings of U.S. government findings that the Saudi network that aided the hijackers had extensive connections to terrorism.

The "finding" of the 9/11 Commission regularly invoked by Saudi Arabia does not exonerate Saudi Arabia.

In their public relations efforts, the Saudis principally have pointed to a single sentence in the 9/11 Commission Report claiming that the 9/11 Commission exonerated the Kingdom. The sentence reads "Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization."

"Today, some commission staff members point out that the wording [of the sentence in question] did not rule out the possibility that lower-ranking Saudi officials had assisted the hijackers. They also said the commission operated under extreme time pressure and was not able to follow up fully on every lead." -- Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, A Saudi Imam, 2 Hijackers and Lingering 9/11 Mystery, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2016.

Far from exonerating the Kingdom, the sentence—as written more than twenty years ago—plainly left open the potential that the 9/11 Commission did find evidence that elements of the Saudi government and non-senior Saudi officials had provided support to al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks. Further, the carefully worded and limited statement that the Kingdom erroneously still relies on twenty years later was qualified by the Commission in the sentence that immediately follows (which the Kingdom does not mention when citing the Commission’s report), in which the Commission confirmed the “likelihood that charities with significant government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda.

“[T]he 9/11 Commission did not exonerate Saudi Arabia of culpability for the events of September 11, 2001, or the financing of al Qaeda in the years leading up to the September 11th attacks. ... [T]he Kingdom is fundamentally incorrect in suggesting that our Commission in some way ‘considered and rejected as factually untrue’ the allegations or claims that have been advanced by the 9/11 plaintiffs against Saudi Arabia.” -- Affidavit of 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman,

In sworn affidavits of 9/11 Commissioners John Lehman and Bob Kerry, filed in the 9/11 lawsuits, both commissioners testified that the commission had not exonerated Saudi

“[I]t is fundamentally inaccurate and misleading for the Kingdom ... to suggest that the 9/11 Commission’s investigation exonerated them for the events of September 11, 2001, or that the 9/11 Commission’s investigation directly rebutted Plaintiffs’ claims.” -- Affidavit of 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey,

Arabia for its role in the September 11th attacks, and had neither considered nor rejected the claims asserted against Saudi Arabia by the plaintiffs. Similarly, 9/11

Commissioner and former Congressman and Ambassador Tim Roemer, in an opinion column published in RealClear Politics, wrote that the Commission “**certainly did not exonerate the Saudis.**”

In 2017—long after the 9/11 Commission closed its investigation—the FBI confirmed Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence operative.

Long after the 9/11 Commission finished its investigation and published its 2004 report, the FBI confirmed in 2017 that Omar Al Bayoumi was an agent working for Saudi Intelligence.

“In the late 1990’s and up to September 11 2001, Omar Albayoumi was paid a monthly stipend as a cooptee of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) via then Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan al Saud.” -- FBI Report, June 14, 2017 [EO14040-002638 to -2639]

In a June 2017 FBI Report, that came into public light with the U.S.

President’s Executive Order 14040 (Sept. 3, 2021), the FBI confirmed that, between the late 1990s through the

“Allegations of al Bayoumi’s involvement with Saudi Intelligence were not confirmed at the time of the 9/11 Commission Report. The above information confirms these allegations.” -- FBI Report, June 14, 2017 [EO14040-002639]

9/11 attacks, Bayoumi had been on the Saudi intelligence service’s payroll, reporting to

then Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan. [See TAB 1: FBI Report Re: Albayoumi/GIF Cooptee Reporting to Prince Bandar, June 14, 2017 [EO14040-002638 to -2639] (PUBLIC Non-MDL version).]

In 2022 and 2023, the Metropolitan Police Service (“MPS”) disclosed a trove of evidence seized from Bayoumi in September 2001, which was made available to the FBI but has never been made public—until now.

Though the efforts to obtain discovery in the long ongoing federal lawsuit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have spanned years, discovery from Saudi Arabia and the U.S. government has been hampered by disputes that have stalled and limited what was obtained from the Kingdom and U.S. agencies. However, as the New York Times summarized in early August 2024, in batches of documents counsel for the 9/11 plaintiffs received in 2022 and 2023 from London’s MPS, the MPS disclosed “a trove of evidence” it had seized from Bayoumi’s home in 2001. *See* TAB 2: Mattathias Schwartz, Video and Airplane Sketch Raise New Questions About Saudi Ties to 9/11, Aug. 9, 2024 (<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/09/nyregion/sept-11-saudi-ties.html>)


“Ten days after the attacks, British police officers raided the home of Mr. al-Bayoumi, Among the items the officers seized was a pad on which Mr. al-Bayoumi had sketched an airplane in blue ink. Above the airplane, he had written out a mathematical equation.” – M. Schwartz, N.Y. Times [See Items at TABS #3 & #4].

The executive Director of the 9/11 Commission acknowledged that the 9/11 Commission was unaware of the evidence from the MPS raid on Bayoumi’s home, noting specifically that the Commission did not know about the aviation sketch and calculations. The 9/11 executive director also acknowledged that “the conclusions drawn by the commission’s 2004 report were dependent on the evidence available at that time.”

“Another piece of new evidence found at Mr. al-Bayoumi’s former home [is] video that he shot in 1999 of the U.S. Capitol, one of the buildings likely targeted by Al Qaeda terrorists in the Sept. 11 attacks. The video shows the Capitol from various sides, with entrances, exits, parking facilities and security guards.” – M. Schwartz, N.Y. Times [See Items at TABS #5 & #6].

The new evidence includes Bayoumi’s airplane sketch with handwritten calculations used to determine the line-of-sight distance to the horizon from an airplane at a given altitude, which aviation experts say are consistent with preparations for the 9/11 attacks.

Among the items the MPS seized from Bayoumi’s home was a “Note Pad” that included a handwritten sketch of an airplane, along with an equation, notes, and calculations. Pltfs’ Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶ 1892. See Item at TAB # 3. Asked about the sketch and calculations at his deposition—apparently for the first time—Bayoumi acknowledged that they were in his handwriting. Pltfs’ Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶ 1897, Ex. 120, Bayoumi Dep. 289:16 to 290:9. The entire original notepad, including the airplane sketch page, was returned to Bayoumi on May 2, 2002.



Pltfs’ Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶ 1893; Ex. 678DD, MPS2023-100 FMT Receipt (slides 20-22; showing item no. 32 returned to Bayoumi as the “Notepad” marked “PSS/34”).”

The first reference found in FBI reports to Bayoumi’s airplane sketch and calculations concerns a March 2012 FBI interview of a pilot (who had reported to the FBI that 9/11 terrorist Mohammed Atta once sat in the jump seat on one of his flights). After examining Bayoumi’s drawing and calculation, the pilot said that, in the context, he “could not think of any other reason for the equation” other than “to calculate the descent rate from a given altitude.” See TAB #4: FBI Report (Apr. 5, 2012) [EO14040-003659 to -3668]

After assessing the evidence, Plaintiffs’ aviation expert, a pilot with nearly seven decades of military and commercial aviation experience, similarly opined that the equation “is used in aviation to determine the line-of-sight distance to the horizon from an airplane at a given altitude.” Pltfs’ Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶ 1900. Based on Plaintiffs’ expert’s assessment, he testified that Bayoumi’s airplane sketch and calculations **“are consistent with preparations made as part of the planning for the 9/11 attacks and were made to assist the 9/11 hijackers in carrying out those attacks.”** Pltfs’ Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶ 1903, Ex. 148, Schiff Report at 2.

The new evidence includes a chilling video Bayoumi recorded in June 1999—when 9/11 targets were being considered—casing the U.S. Capitol building for the attack.

In June 2024, CBS News broadcasted never-before-seen video Omar al Bayoumi recorded in June/July 1999—within 90 days of the time when senior al Qaeda planners were deciding on 9/11 targets—casing the Capitol building in Washington, D.C. See TAB #5: Cecilia Vega, Richard Bonin, Mirella Brussani Investigators for 9/11 families examine video taken by man with ties to Saudi intelligence referencing a “plan,” CBS News, Jun. 20, 2024 (<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bayoumi-video-examined-as-september-11-evidence-60-minutes/?linkId=476595799>). See also TAB #6: CBS News, Face the Nation, Transcript: Former CIA deputy director Michael Morell on “Face the Nation,” Jun. 23, 2024 (<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-full-transcript-06-23-2024/>) (video at <https://x.com/FaceTheNation/status/1804915916087628000>). The 9/11 Commission determined that the initial list of 9/11 targets “included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.” Of the targets the planners considered, “all of them wanted to hit the Capitol.” 9/11 Commission Report at 155.

The video is part of the information the MPS seized from Bayoumi in 2001 and produced to the Plaintiffs in December 2023, days before the briefs to oppose Saudi Arabia’s motion to dismiss were due in the ongoing civil litigation in NY federal court. The video remained sealed in the proceedings until shortly before the CBS News story. Parts of the video can be viewed at the “60 Minutes” and “Face The Nation” links above (also available on the 9/11 Families United website at <https://911familiesunited.org/icymi-former-cia-deputy-director-on-saudi-government-agents-pre-9-11-casing-video-of-u-s-capitol/>).

- The video includes extensive footage of the U.S. Capitol, including its interior columns, entrances and exits, security posts, a model of the building, the building’s spatial relationship to nearby landmarks (e.g., the National Mall, the Washington Monument, other surrounding buildings, and Reagan National Airport).
- Bayoumi directs his comments to his “esteemed brothers,” greeting his audience by saying, “Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah be upon you. From the United States of America. Omar Al-Bayoumi from the Capitol Hill. -- the Capitol Building,” followed seconds later with “Once again, my esteemed viewers, I greet you and I welcome you from the Capitol Hill.”
- Bayoumi references a “plan,” and injects extremist commentary into his narrative on the recording, including referring to those in the Capitol as “demons.”




THE VIDEO IS A “PRE-
OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE
VIDEO OF THE INTENDED TARGET”

Richard Lambert, Retired FBI Chief
of Espionage Section of FBI’s
Counterintelligence Division, see
TAB #5

After assessing the video, retired FBI official Richard Lambert, who had previously served as Chief of the Espionage Section of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, opined that Bayoumi was speaking in the video to al Qaeda planners who had "tasked him to take the pre-operational surveillance video of the intended target."

In a "Face the Nation" interview that aired June 23, 2024, former CIA Deputy Director, Michael Morell said, after studying the video, that there was "[n]o doubt in [his] mind, that is a casing video for some sort of terrorist attack," and that "al Qaeda tasked him to do this casing video."

Former Deputy Director Morell also emphasized the importance of the video, noting that the CIA was not previously made aware of the video, and that if he had known about it, it was something he would have shown to the U.S. President at the time. Morell was the President's briefer at that time.



THERE IS "NO DOUBT IN MY MIND, THAT IS A CASING VIDEO FOR SOME SORT OF TERRORIST ATTACK," AND THAT "AL QAEDA TASKED HIM TO DO THIS CASING VIDEO."

"I WOULD HAVE SHOWN IT TO THE PRESIDENT."

Former CIA Deputy Director, Michael Morell, see TAB #6

The new evidence includes video of Bayoumi with Saudi diplomats and Ministry of Islamic Affairs propagators, who FBI had found to have "a nexus to al Qaeda."

In separate video footage from that same June/July 1999 trip to Washington, D.C., Bayoumi is seen in locations around Washington, D.C., with two Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs ("MOIA") officials, Adel Al Sadhan and Mutaeb Al Sudairy, who FBI investigators concluded had "a nexus to al-Qa'ida." [EO14040-0585] The MOIA had previously, in December 1998-January 1999, sent Sadhan and Sudairy to California, where they spent time as propagators, including at the Al Medina Mosque, where Bayoumi worked.

In June 1999, Saudi Arabia obtained diplomatic positions at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. for both men. But each man soon thereafter relocated to other locations in the U.S.—Sadhan moved to Oklahoma, and Sudairy moved to Missouri, where he lived with Ziyad Khaleel, identified as an Al Qaeda who obtained communications equipment used by Osama Bin Laden and arranged fund transfers from a charity to accounts controlled by Bin Laden. Pltfs' Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶¶ 791, 930.

In the June/July 1999 video, Bayoumi addresses Sudairy as "Sheikh Mutaeb" and refers to him as "the leader, he is the Emir for this trip."

Despite evidence showing Bayoumi's connections with Sadhan and Sudairy, including the video evidence of them familiarly touring D.C. in June 1999 (which was not available when

Sadhan's deposition was done), Sadhan swore at least 18 times in his deposition that he did not know Bayoumi.

The new evidence includes a highly incriminating video of a welcoming party Bayoumi hosted for the two hijackers he helped to integrate into a network in Southern California on their arrival to the U.S.

Bayoumi "Welcome Party" Video

Tab 7: Catherine Herridge, Newly released video shows 9/11 hijackers with alleged Saudi intelligence operative, CBS News, Apr. 27, 2022. (<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/911-hijackers-video-saudi-intelligence-official-omar-al-bayoumi/>)

Tab 8: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, New 9/11 Evidence Points to Deep Saudi Complicity, The Atlantic, May 20, 2024. (<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/05/september-11-attacks-saudi-arabia-lawsuit/678430/>)

Another video from Bayoumi's home video collection seized by the MPS is video from 2000, first seen publicly in an April 2022 CBS News broadcast. See Tab 7. The complete version of the video that the MPS disclosed to counsel for the plaintiffs in the litigation was different from the much shorter set of video clips the FBI had produced, though the MPS had provided the FBI the complete video.

"Two weeks after helping the hijackers settle in San Diego by securing them housing, bank accounts and other assistance, Bayoumi held a welcome party for the [two earliest arriving hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar] at their apartment, which was videotaped ..." by an associate of Bayoumi at his instruction. Pltfs' Memo. of Law (Dec. 20, 2023, corrected Jan. 17, 2024), ECF No. 10193, at 48; Pltfs' Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶¶ 1656-1657.

At the hearing in New York on July 31, 2024, plaintiffs' counsel detailed aspects of the much more complete video, after using digital image analysis and inserting translated subtitles to painstakingly piece together video of the party seized by the MPS to create the fullest account of the party that has ever been seen.

"The translation and analysis of the full video confirms that it was organized by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and their collaborators, to introduce the hijackers to a carefully curated group of like-minded community members and religious leaders, who could be trusted to look after the hijackers and cocoon them in a protective support network. Contrary to the 9/11 Commission's understanding based on the incomplete video it reviewed, the complete video confirms that the hijackers attended and participated in the party throughout, and that they held special status at the event." Pltfs' Memo. of Law (Dec. 20, 2023, corrected

Jan. 17, 2024), ECF No. 10193, at 49; Pltfs' Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶¶ 1668-1712.

The new evidence includes video showing Bayoumi's close relationship with Anwar Al-Awlaki, who the CIA killed in a 2011 drone strike as a senior leader of an al Qaeda affiliate.

In another video from Bayoumi's home movie collection seized by the MPS, believed to be from before 9/11, Bayoumi is seen warmly greeting and embracing the American Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who also supported the hijackers in San Diego and then in Virginia in the months before the 9/11 attack.

Later killed in a CIA drone strike in 2011, Awlaki was the first American targeted for death by the agency as a senior leader of the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, which was responsible for failed plots including the attempted 2009 underwear bombing of a passenger jet on Christmas Day 2009. Awlaki is also blamed for the radicalization of Americans through his digital propaganda and the rise of homegrown terrorism.

Additional findings in newly declassified documents from the U.S. government evidence the Saudi network that aided the hijackers.

2004 Joint FBI-CIA Assessment [EO14040-3414-Updated to -3442-Updated] – See Tab #9

In December 2004, the FBI and CIA conducted a collaborative intelligence assessment of "Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States" ("2004 FBI/CIA Joint Assessment"). Finding from that assessment are summarized here.

The FBI/CIA found "evidence [that] official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States...some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity."

[EO14040-3416]

The FBI/CIA determined that "[t]he Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida." [EO14040-3416]

The FBI/CIA cited efforts by "suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees" and "Saudi-funded clerics" to obtain intelligence inside the U.S. [EO14040-3416]

The 2004 FBI/CIA Joint Assessment also stated that "[t]he Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islami in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions."

[EO14040-3416]

The FBI/CIA concluded that the Saudi Government's actions regarding Al Qaeda put it in a "precarious situation" because it was "treating the group [al Qaeda] with special consideration." [EO14040-3416]

The 2004 FBI/CIA Joint Assessment states that the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation ("Al Haramain") was led by two Saudi government cabinet members. The Joint Assessment found that among the "stated goals" of Al Haramain are to "establish the Salafist Wahhabi fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam." [EO14040-3435]

The FBI/CIA found that:

Two Saudi cabinet members officially supervise [Al Haramain's] activities. The Minister of Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Saleh Bin Abdul Aziz Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh, is the titular head and superintendent of [Al Haramain]. The foundation is part of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, which is headed by the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz al-Sau'd, a member of the Saudi royal family and head of Mabahith.

[EO14040-3435]

The 2004 FBI/CIA Joint Assessment indicated that some Al Haramain offices "provided material support to the terrorist activities of al-Qa'ida around the world," including support for the Al Qaeda cells responsible for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings. [EO14040-3435]

The 2004 FBI/CIA Joint Assessment also observed that Prince Nayif "maintained for months after 11 September 2001 that no Saudis or Arabs had been involved in the attacks, but rather that the attacks were plots by the CIA and Israel's Mossad." [EO14040-3423]

**2016 Operation
Encore Report
(Apr. 4, 2016)
[EO14040
production
document] – See
Tab #10**

In an April 2016 FBI Electronic Communication providing an update on the FBI's Encore Investigation, the report concluded that "[redacted] was tasked by [Saudi diplomat and MOIA propagator, Fahad al-]THUMAIRY to assist HAZMI and MIDHAR [sic] while they were in Los Angeles." [FBI 2016 Operation Encore Report at 6.]

The FBI analyzed phone records and, in the FBI 2016 Operation Encore report, identified phone activity that supports the conclusion that Fahad al-Thumairy assigned assistance to the hijackers.

The FBI found:

...significant phone connectivity between [redacted] and [redacted] prior to and directly following key events of logistic assistance provided by [redacted] to HAZMI and MIDHAR. This pattern of phone connectivity between [redacted] and [redacted] is not identifiable prior to the hijacker's arrival in Los Angeles and does not occur between [redacted] and [redacted] after the hijackers depart California.

[FBI 2016 Operation Encore Report at 6.]

Plaintiffs' expert Youssef opined that the FBI's "report of phone connectivity [between [redacted] and [redacted]] ties in directly with other phone calls made by Thumairy and Bayoumi, and [redacted]" and that based on this evidence "[redacted] and [redacted] were discussing matters pertaining to the two hijackers." Pltfs' Averment, ECF No. 10199, ¶ 1500.

**July 23,
2021 FBI EC
[EO14040-
3478 to EO-
3608] – See
Tab #11**

In a July 23, 2021 FBI Electronic Communication "summarizing the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated with the Saudi Arabian government [SAG] in the U.S., the FBI identified the following points of connection.

"[T]he SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US—many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince

Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network...." [-3480]

"Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.... Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members." [-3485]

"Musaid Aljarrah (Musaed Aljarrah) was one of the known GIP officers in the [Ministry of Islamic Affairs] section." [-3488]

"This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S." [-3490]

"Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah ... was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan." [-3496]

"... Aljarrah had a 'controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California.' Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of Almuhanha ... and Althumairy ... who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA." [-3496 to -3497]

"Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar 'Wahhabi line of thinking' as Mohammed Almohanna." [-3497]

"ALTHUMAIRY was identified [redacted] as a 'hard core extremist' whose sermons at the

King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.” [-3502]

“[Redacted] stated that he was told by [redacted] that Fahad Al-Thumairy ... had asked him to look after two very ‘significant’ people. [Redacted] did not inquire into the word ‘significant’ or why he referred to them this way, other [than] to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important.” [-3503]

“[Redacted] recalls a conversation that he had . . . shortly after ... Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A.... He states that [redacted] told [redacted] that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. [Redacted] asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. [Redacted] stated . . . that he just needed to take them there. [Redacted] . . . advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings.” [-3503]

“Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC.... [A]l-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A ‘welcoming party’ for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.” [-3509]

“Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel . . . for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice.” [-3509]

AL SADHAN works under . . . MUSAED AL-JARRAH [redacted] at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help ALJARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States.” [-3511]

“Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar. [redacted] Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a ‘ghost employee’ while in the U.S.” [-3515]

“The interviewee [an employee of Dallah Al Baraka] estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). ...[Redacted] assured the interviewee that he wanted . . . Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by [redacted]. These purchase orders were controlled by ... [the Presidency of Civil Aviation].” [-3517]

“From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.” [-3519]

“The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism.” [-3580]

“Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel [redacted] continued post 9/11.” [-3587]

Index of Attached Items

Tab

1. FBI Report Re: Albayoumi/GIF Cooptee Reporting to Prince Bandar, June 14, 2017 [EO14040-002638 to -2639] (PUBLIC Non-MDL version).
2. Mattathias Schwartz, Video and Airplane Sketch Raise New Questions About Saudi Ties to 9/11, The New York Times, Aug. 9, 2024 (<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/09/nyregion/sept-11-saudi-ties.html>).
3. Airplane Sketch & Calculations (Ex. 11N MPS999x_4017_5).
4. FBI Report (Apr. 5, 2012) re: Airplane Sketch & Calculations [EO14040-003659 to -3668].
5. Cecilia Vega, Richard Bonin, Mirella Brussani, Investigators for 9/11 families examine video taken by man with ties to Saudi intelligence referencing a “plan,” CBS News, Jun. 20, 2024 (<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bayoumi-video-examined-as-september-11-evidence-60-minutes/?linkId=476595799>).
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